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Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises provably secure cryptography, even to attacks from
an all-powerful adversary. However, with quantum computing development lagging behind QKD,
the assumption that there exists an adversary equipped with a universal fault-tolerant quantum
computer is unrealistic for at least the near future. Here, we explore the effect of restricting the
eavesdropper’s computational capabilities on the security of QKD, and find that improved secret key
rates are possible. Specifically, we show that for a large class of discrete variable protocols higher
key rates are possible if the eavesdropper is restricted to a unitary operation from the Clifford
group. Further, we consider Clifford-random channels consisting of mixtures of Clifford gates. We
numerically calculate a secret key rate lower bound for BB84 with this restriction, and show that
in contrast to the case of a single restricted unitary attack, the mixture of Clifford based unitary
attacks does not result in an improved key rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers a potential
path to quantum-safe cryptography that does not rely on
the conjectured hardness of computational problems. An
important problem in QKD is to devise a protocol that
can be implemented using existing technology while max-
imizing the achievable secret key generation rate. QKD
analyses have, at most times, assumed that the eaves-
dropper is all-powerful: able to perform any quantum
operation on the signals transferred between Alice and
Bob. Such operations can, in principle, be implemented
using a universal quantum computer along with a long
term quantum memory. This security without assump-
tions on the computational power of the adversary is one
of the most compelling reasons to replace classical key
exchange protocols with QKD.
Large scale fault-tolerant quantum computers that can
implement Shor’s factoring algorithm [1] will render cur-
rently used classical cryptosystems such as the Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA) protocol [2], elliptic curve cryp-
tography [3], and Diffie-Hellmann key exchange [4] in-
secure. Several classical cryptosystems, such as code-
based encryption [5], lattice-based encryption [6], and
supersingular isogenies [7] have been proposed as replace-
ments for RSA, and these post-quantum cryptosystems
are based on hard problems that are conjectured to be
difficult for quantum computers to solve efficiently [8].
As with all classical cyptosystems, proof of their security
relies on the computational hardness of the underlying
mathematical problem, or equivalently, on the computa-
tional power limitations of the adversary. In fact, there
is so far no proof that guarantees the nonexistence of an
efficient quantum—or even classical—algorithm to break
these post-quantum cryptosystems. Thus, in many real
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world scenarios, the computational power of the adver-
sary is the physically relevant condition.
While promising security without computational as-
sumptions, in practice QKD protocols have been very
challenging to implement, with successful demonstrations
within a range of only a few hundred kilometers in opti-
cal fibre, see e.g. [9–11], and the rate without intermedi-
ate stations inevitably falls off with the transmittance
of the channel [12]. Quantum repeaters [13–15] have
been proposed as a way to improve over direct trans-
mission [16, 17]. While impressive progress has been
made towards their demonstration, no such repeater has
been realized [18]. However, assuming nothing about
the nature of the adversary is overly pessimistic in the
era of noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) comput-
ers [19]. Moreover, in the classical case, an eavesdropper
can store the public information indefinitely, and attack
in the future when better algorithms or computational
devices become available. In the quantum case, without
a long-lived quantum memory, the eavesdropper must at-
tack during the key exchange. Thus, for near-term QKD
implementations the more relevant concern is the com-
putational power of the eavesdropper today.
In this work, we examine the role that computational
assumptions on the eavesdropper have on the secret key
rate of discrete variable quantum key distribution (DV-
QKD) protocols. We examine the secret key rates that
can be achieved if one restricts the eavesdropper to have
access to a subclass of quantum operations formed by the
Clifford group. Clifford operations are not universal and
circuits built from them can be efficiently simulated clas-
sically [20], such that we would expect such a restriction
to limit the power of the eavesdropper. We show that
this is indeed the case for a large family of DV-QKD
protocols. We then extend to Clifford-random channels,
allowing the eavesdropper to implement a quantum chan-
nel described by a convex combination of unitary Clifford
gates, and numerically calculate a lower bound to the se-
cret key rate possible under this restriction for BB84 [21].
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2The problem of numerically computing the secret key
rate can be cast as a nonlinear semi-definite program
(SDP) [22, 23]. In this framework, it becomes clear that
the optimal attack an eavesdropper can use dictates the
secret key rate that can be achieved. In particular, re-
stricting the computational capabilities of the eavesdrop-
per is equivalent to introducing further constraints to the
key rate SDP. To our knowledge, such computational as-
sumptions on the eavesdropper and their impact on the
secret key rate have not been considered in the literature.
Some work that is similar in spirit considers restric-
tions to the eavesdropper’s ability to perform a coherent
attack, either due to a noisy quantum memory used for
storage [24], or general decoherence [25]. For these mod-
els, it has been shown that limiting the capabilities of the
eavesdropper improves the key rate. Further, improved
key rates can also be found when Eve’s access to a wiretap
channel is restricted, such as in a free-space communica-
tion setting where she can only collect a fraction of the
transmitted optical signals [26].
II. RESULTS
A. Clifford Group Restriction
We consider the broad class of prepare-and-measure
QKD protocols from Ref. [27], for which the set of pos-
sible signal states consists of all elements from either 2,
d, or d + 1 mutually unbiased bases (MUBs), where d
(assumed prime) is the Hilbert space dimension of the
signal-state system. Examples of QKD protocols con-
tained in this class include BB84 [21], and the 6-state
protocol [28]. For these protocols, we assume that the
eavesdropper Eve only has access to Bob’s eventual half
of the system, and use a source-replacement scheme (see
for e.g. [27, 29, 30]) to describe prepare-and-measure pro-
tocols as entanglement-based. We are interested in Eve’s
optimal attack that minimizes the secret key rate.
The key observation of this section is that for the pro-
tocols described in Ref. [27], the state ρAB describing
the optimal attack is also the Choi state describing the
effective channel Eve implements on Bob’s system. We
can then ask what computational resources are required
to simulate this effective channel, and determine if a re-
stricted Eve can implement the optimal attack. We show
that a Clifford-restricted Eve cannot implement the op-
timal attack in all situations. In the following we present
our results, with details of the derivation contained in
the appendix A.
The optimal attack for the protocols described in
Ref. [27] leaves the final state of Alice and Bob in what
is known as a Bell-diagonal state
ρAB =
d−1∑
r,s
br,s
∣∣Bdr,s〉〈Bdr,s∣∣ , (1)
where br,s are related to the bit-error rate and satisfy
∑d−1
r,s br,s = 1 and 0 ≤ br,s ≤ 1. Here
∣∣Bdr,s〉 (see ap-
pendix A) is a generalized Bell state. We now show how
we can recast this expression in the form
ρAB = ρEB = I ⊗ EB
(∣∣Bd0,0〉〈Bd0,0∣∣) , (2)
where ρEB is the Choi dual-state describing the effective
process on Bob’s qubit due to Eve’s interaction.
We recall that the Choi dual-state of a quantum pro-
cess E is defined by the action of the process on half of
the maximally entangled state
∣∣Bd0,0〉 [31]. Using that∣∣Bdr,s〉 = Iˆd ⊗ Pˆ dr,s ∣∣Bd0,0〉 , (3)
where Pˆ dr,s are generalized Pauli matrices (see appendix
A), we rewrite the optimal attack as
ρAB =
d−1∑
r,s
br,s Iˆd ⊗ Pˆ dr,s
∣∣Bd0,0〉〈Bd0,0∣∣ Iˆd ⊗ (Pˆ dr,s)† , (4)
which has the desired form of a Choi dual-state, demon-
strating that ρAB = ρEB .
From here, it is straightforward to see that the effective
channel EB on Bob’s system resulting from Eve’s optimal
attack is
EB(ρB) =
d−1∑
r,s
br,sPˆ
d
r,sρB
(
Pˆ dr,s
)†
. (5)
We refer to this as a Pauli-random channel, as it is the
convex combination of generalized Pauli operations. The
main result of this section is that even given an arbitrary
finite number (NE) of ancilla qudits, a Clifford-restricted
Eve (acting with a Clifford gate on the joint system BE)
cannot implement the optimal attack for all values of br,s,
as she cannot simulate the effective channel of Eq. (5).
To see this, consider the Choi dual-state for Eve’s Clif-
ford attack Uˆ ∈ C`⊗NE+1d
ρU = IˆD ⊗ Uˆ
∣∣BD0,0〉〈BD0,0∣∣ IˆD ⊗ Uˆ† (6)
where D = dNE+1. One can easily show that the maxi-
mally entangled state for any dimensionD can be written
as the following sum in the generalized Pauli basis
∣∣BD0,0〉〈BD0,0∣∣ = 1D
D−1∑
r,s,s′
s+s′=0 mod D
PˆDr,s ⊗ PˆDr,s′ . (7)
Putting this into Eq. (6), and using the fact the Clifford
gates permute the members of the Pauli group, we have
that
ρU =
1
D
D−1∑
r,s,s′
s+s′=0 mod D
eiφq(r,s′) PˆDr,s ⊗ PˆDq(r,s′), (8)
3where q(r, s′) describes the permutation action of the
Clifford gate Uˆ and φq(r,s′) describes the associated phase
factor.
To determine the Choi dual-state for the effective pro-
cess on Bob’s qudit alone, we take the partial trace with
respect to all NE of Eve’s ancilla qubits on both D-
dimensional subsystems of the Choi dual-state [32]
ρUB =
1
d
d−1∑
n,m,j,k
µ(n,m, j, k)Pˆ dn,m ⊗ Pˆ dj,k, (9)
where µ(n,m, j, k) is either zero or a complex phase (see
appendix A for details).
The expression for ρUB should be compared to the
Choi dual-state for the optimal attack channel given by
Eq. (4), which can be rewritten in the Pauli basis as
ρAB =
d−1∑
r,s
br,s
d
d−1∑
n,k,k′
k+k′=0 mod d
eiφqr,s(n,k′) Pˆ dn,k ⊗ Pˆ dqr,s(n,k′)
(10)
where we have used the fact that Pauli operators are
themselves Clifford operators and so permute the ele-
ments of the Pauli group. Note that each term in the
Pauli-random optimal attack channel results in a unique
permutation, qr,s, of the Pauli basis elements.
Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) are in general inequivalent, as
is illustrated by the fact that each of the Pauli basis
elements in ρUB has a coefficient that has magnitude
either 0 or 1/d, while in ρAB the corresponding coeffi-
cient can have any complex value with magnitude less
than 1/d (determined by a sum of elements from the set
{eiφqr,s(n,k′)br,s}). Thus, except for specific values of br,s,
Eve cannot simulate the optimal attack channel with only
a Clifford gate, and so cannot implement the optimal at-
tack.
As a specific example, consider BB84, where the opti-
mal attack channel is given by
EB(ρB) = (1−Q)2IˆρB Iˆ +Q2Yˆ ρBYˆ
+Q(1−Q)
(
XˆρBXˆ + ZˆρBZˆ
)
, (11)
withQ the average bit-error rate for all signal-state bases.
For Q = 0, 1, 0.5, this effective channel can be imple-
mented using a Clifford gate on BE, and we cannot rule
out the possibility that restricted Eve can implement the
optimal attack. For all other values of Q this is not the
case. Note that for Q = 0, 1 the key rate is not reduced
by Eve’s interaction.
As Eq. (9) shows, a Clifford attack can be understood
as a permutation of the Pauli basis operators of system
B, along with an acquired phase. For BB84, the two-
qubit maximally entangled state can be written in the
Pauli basis as∣∣B20,0〉〈B20,0∣∣ = 14 (Iˆ⊗ Iˆ + Xˆ ⊗ Xˆ − Yˆ ⊗ Yˆ + Zˆ ⊗ Zˆ) ,
and there are six allowed permutations of the Pauli oper-
ators on system B, with each element taking one of two
phases (±1). Not all 64 possibilities result in a valid den-
sity matrix, but for those that do we calculate the key
rate and compare to the worst case of Eq. (11), with Q
determined from the output state of the Clifford attack
channel. As expected, for Q = 0, 1, 0.5 the Clifford and
worst case key rates are the same. For Q = 0.25, 0.75
(the only other values possible for Clifford attacks), the
Clifford attack key rate is finite, while the the worst case
key rate is zero.
B. Clifford-Random Channel Restriction
For the protocols we consider, we have shown that a
Pauli-random channel describes the effective channel on
Bob’s qudit for the optimal eavesdropping attack, and
that this cannot be implemented by a Clifford gate on
the combined system BE. Given these facts, a natural
relaxation for the eavesdropper restriction would be to
give her the ability to perform Clifford-random channels
E(ρ) =
∑
g∈C`
ag IˆA ⊗ UˆgρIˆA ⊗ Uˆ†g , (12)
where Uˆg is an (NE+1)-qudit Clifford gate, and
∑
g ag =
1. Practically, such a channel can be implemented by
Eve if she acts with a random Clifford gate on each sig-
nal state she intercepts. This requires only the ability to
implement Clifford gates, plus a source of classical ran-
domness.
Given such capability, the eavesdropper can directly
implement the effective channel of Eq. (5), and simu-
late the statistics of the optimal attack. However, this
does not mean that that the eavesdropper can implement
the optimal attack that gives her the most information.
As such, we wish to quantify how much information a
Clifford-random channel restricted Eve can obtain, by
determining a lower bound to the secret key rate for this
restriction. To do so, we will use the numerical optimiza-
tion approach developed in Refs. [22, 23], where a com-
putational restriction on the eavesdropper will introduce
constraints to the optimization, shrinking the feasible set
of states ρAB describing the optimal attack.
Let us denote the combined state of ABE after the
Clifford-random channel as ρABE , which will in general
be a mixed state. We introduce an auxiliary Hilbert space
F that is sufficiently large to purify ρABE into the pure
state ρABEF . Using the results of Refs. [22, 33], it is
straightforward to see that the secret key rate is given by
the expression
k(ρABF ) = r(ρABF )− ppassleakEC, (13)
r(ρABF ) = D(G(ρABF )||ZR(G(ρABF )))
where D(ρ||σ) = Tr[ρ(log ρ − log σ)] is the quantum rel-
ative entropy.
4As described in detail in Ref. [23], G(.) is a completely
positive trace-nonincreasing quantum channel that de-
scribes the measurements, public announcements, and
post selection performed by Alice and Bob, with ppass
the probability that the post selection is successful. The
term leakEC describes the information leaked (and avail-
able to the eavesdropper) during the error correction used
to generate a secure key, and ZR(.) is a pinching chan-
nel over the Hilbert space R that records the results of
Alice’s key-map
ZR(ρ) =
∑
i
|i〉〈i|R ρ |i〉〈i|R , (14)
where {|i〉R} is an orthonormal basis for R.
To find a lower bound for the key rate, we would
solve the nonlinear semi-definite program (SDP), defined
in Ref. [23], that finds the state ρ∗ABF that minimizes
r(ρABF ) from Eq. (13), taking into account constraints
on the final state ρABF that come from channel reconcili-
ation, such as the quantum bit error rate. Unfortunately,
without knowledge of the nature of F , we cannot calcu-
late Eq. (13), and thus cannot evaluate the cost function
of our SDP.
However, using the monotonicity of the quantum rela-
tive entropy under completely positive and trace preserv-
ing maps, we have that
D(G(ρ∗ABF )||ZR(G(ρ∗ABF ))) ≥ D(G(ρ∗AB)||ZR(G(ρ∗AB)))
where ρ∗AB = TrF [ρ
∗
ABF ]. Using this, clearly
r(ρ∗ABF ) ≥ r(ρ∗AB) ≥ r(ρ′AB), (15)
with ρ′AB the optimal solution for a key rate SDP over
states in AB. It is straightforward to modify the SDP
of Ref. [23] to include constraints from restricted Eve
(see appendices B and C for details), and thus we can
numerically find a lower bound to the key rate for the
optimal Clifford-random channel attack.
In practice, numerical SDP solvers are not able to re-
turn the exact optimal solution ρ′AB . Solving the primal
problem of the SDP will in general give an upper bound
to the optimum, so instead we solve the dual problem,
which gives a lower bound. This guarantees that r(ρ′AB)
is a lower bound to the secret key rate. To solve the
dual problem we use the convex approximation to the
quantum relative entropy developed in [34], which inte-
grates with CVX, a Matlab package for specifying and
solving convex problems [35, 36]. In appendix F we dis-
cuss how to obtain a secure lower bound using either the
techniques from Ref. [34] or from Ref. [23], and present
numerical evidence that our approximate lower bounds
are accurate to high precision.
C. Clifford-Random Channel Restricted BB84
As an example of our numerical approach, we consider
prepare-and-measure BB84, with the modifcation that
we allow the initial state to be any state of the form
|ΨI〉AA′ =
√
b |00〉+√1− b |11〉 , (16)
where 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. After Alice prepares this initial state,
she sends the second register A′ to Bob via the insecure
quantum channel that Eve has access to, and we call
the register after the transmission B. For b 6= 1/2 these
initial states lead to BB84 protocols that we refer to as
asymmetric.
The protocol we consider is outlined as follows (details
can be found in appendix D):
• Alice and Bob each independently measure in the
Z-basis or X-basis, with probability p and 1 − p
respectively.
• Alice’s key-map maps the +1 measurement out-
come to the character 0, and a −1 outcome to the
character 1, i.e.
{|0〉 , |+〉} → 0 {|1〉 , |−〉} → 1 (17)
where |±〉 ∝ |0〉 ± |1〉 are the eigenstates of Xˆ.
• Alice and Bob perform channel reconciliation,
which adds one of two sets of constraints to the
SDP, both of which can be calculated from asymp-
totic measurement statistics.
1. Coarse-grained constraints:
Tr
[
ρABEˆZ/X
]
= γz/x, (18)
where
EˆZ = |01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10| , (19)
EˆX = |+−〉〈+−|+ |−+〉〈−+| . (20)
2. Fine-grained constraints:
Tr
[
ρABEˆij
]
= γij , (21)
where
Eˆij = Mˆi ⊗ Mˆj (22)
with Mˆi ∈ {|0〉〈0| , |1〉〈1| , |+〉〈+| , |−〉〈−|}
• Further constraints to the SDP come from the com-
plete knowledge of Alice’s reduced state, to which
Eve does not have access, and from our knowledge
of Eve’s restriction.
We simulate data to calculate the constraints and the er-
ror correction cost leakEC using a depolarizing channel
with depolarizing probability  (see appendix E for fur-
ther details). For our input state on AA′, this produces
an output state on AB given by
Edep(ρAA′) = (1− ) ρAA′ + TrB [ρAA′ ]⊗ 1
2
IˆB , (23)
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Figure 1. Secret key rate lower bound function as a function
of a) channel error  and b) asymmetry parameter b, with
or without a restricted eavesdropper, and with either coarse
or fine grained constraints are considered. For the restricted
eavesdropper the key rate is the same for both sets of con-
straints. Fixed parameters indicated on each subplot.
where ρAA′ is the pure state of Eq. (16). We will alter-
natively refer to  as the channel error, as it is the error
added to the state by the insecure channel between Alice
and Bob.
The results of our numerical calculations of key rate
lower bounds for a Clifford-channel restricted Eve are
shown in Fig. 1. These are compared with the key rates
for an unrestricted Eve (we solve both the primal and
dual problem, and find a duality gap much smaller than
our reported key rate). Fig. 1a) shows the key rate lower
bound for an asymmetric initial state (b = 1/9) as a func-
tion of the channel error , while Fig. 1b) varies the asym-
metry parameter b, and keeps the channel error fixed to
 = 0.1. In both cases the probability that either Alice
or Bob measure in the Z-basis is p = 0.5.
As both plots show, the comparison between the re-
stricted and unrestricted key rates depends strongly on
the constraints used in the SDP, i.e. in how much char-
acterization Alice and Bob do of the insecure channel
connecting them. For the coarse-grained constraints the
restricted key rate lower bound can be significantly larger
than the unrestricted key rate (depending on the asym-
metry), while for the fine-grained constraints they are
identical (note that the restricted key rate lower bound
is the same regardless of the constraints). This result
is unsurprising, as from the perspective of the SDP op-
timization, restricting Eve is equivalent to adding addi-
tional constraints. It turns out that for BB84 the addi-
tional constraints coming from a restricted Eve can also
be determined by fine-grained channel reconciliation. In
fact, we can determine that it is the constraint
γIZ =
〈
IˆA ⊗ ZˆB
〉
ρAB
=
1∑
n,k=0
(−1)k 〈n, k| ρAB |n, k〉 ,
= γ00 − γ01 + γ10 − γ11 (24)
provided by both restricted Eve and the fine-grained con-
straints that is responsible.
III. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have studied the role of computa-
tional capabilities of the eavesdropper on secret key rates
achievable for a QKD protocol. Specifically, for discrete
variable protocols with d-MUBs and Weyl-Heisenberg
symmetry, we found that the optimal attack for the
eavesdropper cannot be implemented by a single Clif-
ford gate with even an arbitrary number of ancilla qudits
given to the eavesdropper. In the specific case of BB84,
finite key rates are possible for a Clifford-gate restricted
eavesdropper when the worst case attack has zero key
rate.
We then considered Clifford-random channels, and de-
rived a way to use the numerical approach of Ref. [23]
to find a lower bound for eavesdropper attacks with a
total final state that is mixed. Again for BB84, we cal-
culated the secret key rate with a Clifford-random chan-
nel restricted eavesdropper by modifying the SDP to in-
corporate the restriction. To do so, we have developed
several reductions to the QKD numerical SDP problem
to make it computationally tractable, generalizations of
which may find use in other numerical studies of QKD
protocols (see Ref. [37] and appendix D for further de-
tails). We found that the difference between the worst
case Clifford-random channel restricted key rate and the
optimal attack key rate depends on the information ob-
tained during channel reconciliation.
For BB84 we found that a Clifford-random channel re-
striction does not reveal any information about the chan-
nel not available from full channel reconciliation, and
there is no key rate improvement for a restricted eaves-
dropper. However, we have only calculated a lower bound
to the key rate, due to our inability to describe the pu-
rifying system F . To calculate the key rate, or bound it
more tightly, future research is needed to develop meth-
ods for calculating secret key rates with mixed final states
(where the problem cannot be cast in terms of the quan-
tum relative entropy), or that incorporate the purifying
auxiliary system [38, 39].
6Further, while we have not shown an improved key
rate lower bound for Clifford-random channel restricted
BB84, we have analytically shown an improved key rate
for Clifford-gate restricted BB84. Thus, we anticipate
that numerical approaches similar to ours will find im-
proved key rates for other restrictions, and other pro-
tocols, especially those with systems in larger Hilbert
spaces. We intend our work to serve as the initiation
point for the general study of QKD with computational
restrictions. This will be especially relevant in the near
term, where QKD technological development is likely to
outpace the development of universal quantum comput-
ers.
We have studied restrictions involving Clifford gates,
as these are most likely to be fault-tolerantly imple-
mentable in the near future (e.g. on the surface code
[40]), and can be implemented transversally i.e., in a par-
allel fashion. Further, they are analogous to Gaussian
operations in the continuous variable (CV) case, which
can be implemented with only linear optics, and hence
provide a reasonable model for restrictions on the eaves-
dropper for CV systems. Future work will seek to gen-
eralize the study of computational restrictions to such
CV-QKD protocols, and to implementations of DV-QKD
using weak coherent states.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the Clifford Gate
Effective Channel
The generalized Bell states for two qudits are
∣∣Bdr,s〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
e
2ipi
d ks |k〉 |k + r〉 , (A1)
and the generalized Pauli matrices of dimension d are
Pˆ dr,s =
d−1∑
k=0
e
2ipi
d ks |k + r〉〈k| . (A2)
From Eq. (8), deriving the Choi state for the effective
process on Bob’s qudit alone is done by taking the partial
trace of Eve’s NE ancilla qubits as follows
ρUB
=
1
D
D−1∑
r,s,s′
s+s′=0
eiφq(r,s′)Tr1...NE
[
PˆDr,s
]
⊗ Tr1...NE
[
PˆDq(r,s′)
]
=
1
d
d−1∑
n,m,j,k
µ(n,m, j, k)Pˆ dn,m ⊗ Pˆ dj,k, (A3)
where for brevity, when we write s+ s′ = 0 it should be
understood that this is addition modulo D. To arrive at
the last line we have used the fact that
Tr
[
Pˆ dr,s
]
= dδr,0δs,0, (A4)
and that a dNE -dimensional Pauli operator is a tensor
product of NE d-dimensional Pauli operators. The com-
plex weight function µ(n,m, j, k) is zero unless
PˆDr,s = Iˆ
⊗NE
d ⊗ Pˆ dn,m and PˆDq(r,s′) = Iˆ⊗NEd ⊗ Pˆ dj,k (A5)
can be satisfied simultaneously for some valid r, s, and
s′, in which case it takes the value of eiφq(r,s′) .
Appendix B: Semi-definite Program Setup for BB84
With no restriction on the eavesdropper, there is no
need to introduce the auxilliary system F , and we can
directly solve an SDP for ρAB [23]. We solve the SDP
min
ρAB
(
p2D(ρAB ||ZAZ (ρAB)) + (1− p)2D(ρAB ||ZAX(ρAB))
)
ρAB ≥ 0, Tr (ρAB) = 1
Tr
(
ρABEˆZ/X
)
= γz/x OR Tr
(
ρABEˆij
)
= γij〈
XˆA
〉
ρAB
=
〈
Yˆ A
〉
ρAB
= 0,
〈
ZˆA
〉
ρAB
= 2b2 − 1
where the minimization is over ρAB ∈ B(HAB). The
second line of constraints implements either the coarse-
or fine-grained constraints from channel reconciliation.
Here ZKµ (.) is the pinching channel on Hilbert space K
in the basis of the operator µˆ. The derivation of this
SDP can be found in Ref. [23], except for the separation
of the objective function into two parts, which can be
found in appendix D. This separation enables all opera-
tions to be on the AB Hilbert space alone. The last line
of constraints comes from the complete knowledge of the
reduced state of Alice, where we have used the shorthand〈
µˆA
〉
ρAB
= Tr
(
ρABµˆ⊗ Iˆ
)
, (B1)
for compactness.
A restriction on Eve’s computational power places ad-
ditional constraints in this optimization problem, which
reduces the set of feasible ρAB . As such we can augment
7the SDP written above with additional constraints on
ρAB that encode how the set of operations the eavesdrop-
per can perform is restricted. However, for our Clifford-
random channel restriction we find it simpler to introduce
a parameterization of ρAB in the feasible set in a smart
choice of matrix basis, as it is not straightforward to con-
struct additional constraints of the standard form used
in [23]. Some of the coefficients in this parameterization
are constrained optimization parameters, which we label
Cjµ.
For a Clifford-random channel restricted eavesdropper,
we solve the SDP
min
Cjµ∈R
r
(
ρAB
[
Cjµ
])
ρAB ≥ 0
Tr
(
ρABEˆZ/X
)
= γz/x, OR Tr
(
ρABEˆij
)
= γij∑
j,µ
Cjµ = 3,
∑
µ
Cjµ ≤ 1 ∀j, 0 ≤ Cjµ ≤ 1
where ρAB
[
Cjµ
]
is the state written in our chosen ma-
trix basis, with free parameters Cjµ. For compactness of
notation we have suppressed the functional dependence
of ρAB on the free parameters Cjµ below the first line.
The function r
(
ρAB
[
Cjµ
])
is the same as in the unre-
stricted SDP, but with ρAB replaced by ρAB
[
Cjµ
]
. The
optimization domain becomes the real numbers for the
free parameters Cjµ.
The parameterized ρAB
[
Cjµ
]
lies within a subset of
the Hermitian, trace one matrices, defined by additional
constraints coming from the eavesdropper’s restriction to
Clifford-random channels. The complete knowledge of
Alice’s reduced state is also encoded in this parameteri-
zation, so those constraints are not added to the SDP as
they are for the unrestricted case. A complete description
of the parameterization of ρAB
[
Cjµ
]
and its derivation
can be found in appendix C.
Both SDPs require optimizations over density matrices
within the AB Hilbert space alone. However, unlike in
the standard problem setup [23], we have derived an SDP
where the operations performed on ρAB do not require
dilation to a larger Hilbert space that includes descrip-
tions of measurement outcomes, public announcements,
and post selection. For instance, the pinching channels
are on the Hilbert space A instead of R. This greatly
improves the numerical performance of the optimization.
A detailed description of how we have reduced the op-
erational Hilbert space dimension of the secret key rate
function can be found in appendix D, and is related to
techniques used in [37].
Appendix C: Restricted Eavesdropper for Qubit
Systems
1. General Setup
In a prepare-and-measure setup, via a source replace-
ment scheme we can describe the initial state of Alice
and Bob as
|ΨI〉AA′ =
∑
n
√
pn |n〉 |φn〉 , (C1)
where Alice records the choice of the state she prepares
in the register A and sends the state in register A′ to Bob
which becomes the system B after the channel controlled
by Eve. The full initial state of Alice, Bob and Eve is
|ΨI〉AA′E = |ΨI〉AA′ |0〉⊗NE . (C2)
where assuming Eve’s initial state is pure, we can with
complete generality define it to be the product state of
all Eve’s ancilla qubits in the state |0〉. Eve can act only
on the A′ half of the initial AA′ state, as well as her
own state. Assuming Eve implements the unitary Uˆ ∈
B (HA′ ⊗HE), which is a general description for Eve’s
attack under the i.i.d. assumption we have made, then
the final state of ABE is given by
ρABE = Uˆ |ΨI〉〈ΨI |AA′E Uˆ†. (C3)
The state of AB alone is ρAB = TrE (ρABE), which we
parameterize as
ρAB =
∑
i
γiΓˆi +
∑
j
ωjΩˆj . (C4)
Here Γˆi are the operators whose expectation value with
the state ρAB is known, either through the complete
knowledge of the state of A, ρA = TrAE (ρABE), or from
parameter estimation. The set Ωˆj complete an orthonor-
mal basis for operator space, and have unknown expec-
tation values given by
ωj = Tr
(
ρABΩˆj
)
= Tr
(
Uˆ |ΨI〉〈ΨI |ABE Uˆ†Ωˆj
)
= 〈ΨI |ABE Uˆ†ΩˆjUˆ |ΨI〉ABE ≡
〈
Uˆ†ΩˆjUˆ
〉
, (C5)
where the last expression is a notational definition we use
for convenience.
2. Restricting to Clifford Operations
Let us assume that Eve can only implement Clifford
gates on the combined system BE. Then it is smart to
choose Γˆi and Ωˆj to be Pauli operators. In Eq. (C5) we
consider the full system ABE, and so append the identity
8operator acting on Eve’s system to Γˆi and Ωˆj , such that
we set
Γˆi = Pˆ
A
i ⊗ PˆBi ⊗ Iˆ⊗NE , (C6)
Ωˆj = Pˆ
A
j ⊗ PˆBj ⊗ Iˆ⊗NE , (C7)
with PˆAj , PˆBj ∈ 1√2{Iˆ, Xˆ, Yˆ , Zˆ} normalized single-qubit
Pauli operators. The restriction to Clifford operations
is such that Eve can only implement a unitary Uˆg ∈
C` (HA′ ⊗HE), and the operation on the full Hilbert
space ABE is given by
Uˆ = IˆA ⊗ Uˆg. (C8)
As Clifford operations map Pauli matrices to other
Pauli matrices, we see that
ωj =
〈(
IˆA ⊗ Uˆ†g
)
Ωˆj
(
IˆA ⊗ Uˆg
)〉
=
〈
±Ωˆ(g)j
〉
, (C9)
where Ωˆ(g)j = Pˆ
A
j ⊗ Pˆ (g)j with Pˆ (g)j =
±Uˆ†g
(
PˆBj ⊗ Iˆ⊗NE
)
Uˆg an NE + 1 qubit Pauli oper-
ator. Note that the ± sign in the expecation value is
meant to imply that depending on the Clifford gate Uˆg,
we may have either +Ωˆ(g)j or −Ωˆ(g)j .
Extending to Clifford-random channels, Eve’s action is
generically described by
ρABE =
∑
g∈C`
ag IˆA ⊗ Uˆg |ΨI〉〈ΨI |AA′E IˆA ⊗ Uˆ†g , (C10)
with
∑
g ag = 1. Then for the unknown parameters ωj
we have
ωj =
∑
g
ag
〈(
IˆA ⊗ Uˆ†g
)
Ωˆj
(
IˆA ⊗ Uˆg
)〉
, (C11)
where, as a reminder Ωˆj is a two-qubit Pauli operator
on AB (dilated to account for E). To make this more
explicit, we define
ωkj =
∑
g
ag
〈(
IˆA ⊗ Uˆ†g
)
PˆAk ⊗ PˆBj ⊗ Iˆ⊗NE
(
IˆA ⊗ Uˆg
)〉
=
∑
g
ag
〈
PˆAk ⊗ PˆBj,g ⊗ PˆEj,g
〉
, (C12)
where we have defined
PˆBj,g ⊗ PˆEj,g = Uˆ†g
(
PˆBj ⊗ Iˆ⊗NE
)
Uˆg, (C13)
with PˆEj,g aNE-qubit Pauli matrix that is not normalized.
From here, the first key observation is that since Eve’s
initial state is |0〉⊗NE , then only those NE-qubit Pauli
operators contained within the set PˆEj,g ∈ {Iˆ, Zˆ}⊗NE have
a nonzero expectation value with Eve’s initial state. Thus
we have that 〈
PˆEj,g
〉
= 0 or ± 1 (C14)
and we can rewrite Eq. (C12) as∑
g
ag
〈
PˆAk ⊗ PˆBj,g ⊗ PˆEj,g
〉
=
∑
g
ag
〈
PˆAk ⊗ PˆBj,g
〉〈
PˆEj,g
〉
=
∑
gj+
agj+
〈
PˆAk ⊗ PˆBj,g
〉
−
∑
gj−
agj−
〈
PˆAk ⊗ PˆBj,g
〉
. (C15)
The last expression not only splits the summation into
two parts, but drops all ag with
〈
PˆEj,g
〉
= 0, and so the
sum of the remaining ag may be less than one.
Further, we know that for PˆBj 6= Iˆ/
√
2, the action of
Uˆg can only transform PˆBj such that PˆBj,g ∈ 1√2{Xˆ, Yˆ , Zˆ}.
This allows us to split Eq. (C12) into 6 separate sums,
distinguished by PˆBj,g and Eq. (C15)
√
2ωkj =
∑
gjX
agjX
〈
PˆAk ⊗ XˆB
〉
+
∑
gjY
agjY
〈
PˆAk ⊗ Yˆ B
〉
+
∑
gjZ
agjZ
〈
PˆAk ⊗ ZˆB
〉
−
∑
gj−X
agj−X
〈
PˆAk ⊗ XˆB
〉
−
∑
gj−Y
agj−Y
〈
PˆAk ⊗ Yˆ B
〉
−
∑
gj−Z
agj−Z
〈
PˆAk ⊗ ZˆB
〉
,
(C16)
where now the summation index gjµ, for µˆ ∈ {Xˆ, Yˆ , Zˆ},
runs over all (NE+1)-qubit Clifford gates that transform
PˆBj of Eq. (C12) such that
√
2PˆBj ⊗ Iˆ⊗NE −→ µˆ ⊗ PˆEg ,
with
µˆ ∈ {Xˆ, Yˆ , Zˆ} and PˆEg ∈ {Iˆ, Zˆ}⊗NE s.t.
〈
PˆEg
〉
= 1
or
µˆ ∈ −{Xˆ, Yˆ , Zˆ} and PˆEg ∈ {Iˆ, Zˆ}⊗NE s.t.
〈
PˆEg
〉
= −1
which gives a + sign to the coefficient agjµ , and the sum-
mation index gj−µ runs over all (NE + 1)-qubit Clifford
gates that transform PˆBj as before but with
µˆ ∈ −{Xˆ, Yˆ , Zˆ} and PˆEg ∈ {Iˆ, Zˆ}⊗NE s.t.
〈
PˆEg
〉
= 1
or
µˆ ∈ {Xˆ, Yˆ , Zˆ} and PˆEg ∈ {Iˆ, Zˆ}⊗NE s.t.
〈
PˆEg
〉
= −1
which gives a − sign to the coefficient agj−µ .
We have only considered j = 1, 2, 3 which corresponds
to PˆBj ∈ 1√2{Xˆ, Yˆ , Zˆ}, as for PˆB0 = Iˆ/
√
2 the expressions
for ωk0 are trivially given by
ωk0 =
1√
2
∑
g
ag
〈(
IˆA ⊗ Uˆg
)
PˆAk ⊗ IˆB ⊗ Iˆ⊗NE
(
IˆA ⊗ Uˆ†g
)〉
=
1√
2
〈ΨI |AA′ PˆAk ⊗ IˆB |ΨI〉AA′ , (C17)
9and describe the initial state of A.
The summations in Eq. (C16) separate the Clifford
group into disjoint subsets defined by the action of its
elements on a Pauli operator PˆBj , and therefore the sets
of free parameters {agjν} are disjoint for a given j. For
each summation, we can therefore define
Cjν =
∑
gjν
agjν , (C18)
and rewrite Eq. (C16) as
√
2ωkj = C
j
X
〈
PˆAk ⊗ XˆB
〉
+ CjY
〈
PˆAk ⊗ Yˆ B
〉
+ CjZ
〈
PˆAk ⊗ ZˆB
〉
− Cj−X
〈
PˆAk ⊗ XˆB
〉
− Cj−Y
〈
PˆAk ⊗ Yˆ B
〉
− Cj−Z
〈
PˆAk ⊗ ZˆB
〉
. (C19)
By properties of the ag, the parameters Cjν satisfy 0 ≤
Cjν ≤ 1 and
∑
ν C
j
ν ≤ 1 ∀j. The normalization is an
inequality as not all ag will survive Eq. (C15).
For each j, the parameters Cjν are independent of one
another as they are sums over disjoint sets of the Clifford
group. However, for different j the Cjν are not guaranteed
to be independent of one another, as the separation of
the Clifford group into sets defined by the action of its
elements on a Pauli operator PˆBj ⊗Iˆ⊗NE depends strongly
on the specific PˆBj . Considering all j gives a total of 18
Cjν , and we have that
∑
j,ν C
j
ν ≤ 3. This normalization
inequality is saturated when the Clifford-random channel
consists of Clifford gates that act nontrivially for all PˆBj ⊗
Iˆ⊗NE , i.e. never take the value of zero in Eq. (C14).
The second key observation of our derivation is that for
the purposes of searching for an optimal attack, we can
treat all Cjν as independent, up to their normalization, as
such a search space will necessarily contain all valid Cjν
for a Clifford-random channel attack. Thus, the optimal
attack found in this enlarged search space will produce
a key rate that is guaranteed to be a lower bound for
the worst case key rate due to a Clifford-random channel
attack.
We further assert that all valid density matrices in the
search space with Cjν independent correspond to a valid
Clifford-random channel attack. We cannot prove that
this is the case, but we give a strong argument in what
follows. To see that this is likely the case, we contend
that there are enough (NE + 1)-Clifford gates that it is
possible to select 18 of them such that Cjν = agjν are all
independent. Other Clifford gates added to the channel
can increase the value of one or more Cjν . In the case
where more than one Cjν have their value increased, then
the sum of all Cjν can exceed unity. This effect, plus
the 18 gates giving independent control is sufficient to
generate any value of the free parameters Cjν such that
0 ≤ Cjν ≤ 1 ,
∑
ν C
j
ν ≤ 1 ∀j,
∑
j,ν C
j
ν ≤ 3, and ρAB ≥ 0.
We note that it is possible to select values of Cjν that
do not correspond to a valid Clifford-random attack, but
only if one of the constraints listed previously is violated.
The selection of 18 Clifford gates for independent Cjν
implies that each of these gates acts nontrivially (nonzero
expectation value in Eq. (C14)) on only one of the three
possible initial operators PˆBj ⊗ Iˆ⊗NE . There are three
sets of six that each act nontrivially on the same initial
operator, and within these sets, each Clifford gate maps
the initial Pauli operator to one of the six distinct final
Pauli operators (including the ±1 phase). The selection
of 18 such Clifford gates is possible because the elements
of the Clifford group realize all permutations of the Pauli
group (with a ±1 phase) that preserve its commutation
structure, and we are considering the (NE + 1)-Clifford
group, with NE an arbitrarily large, but finite, number.
3. Application to BB84
Consider asymmetric BB84, with the initial state of
Alice and Bob given by
|ΨI〉AA′ =
√
b |00〉+√1− b |11〉 , (C20)
where 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, as used in the main text. From this
we can work out the expressions for ωkj from Eq. (C19).
For PˆA0 = I/
√
2, PˆA1 = Xˆ/
√
2, PˆA2 = Yˆ /
√
2, and PˆA3 =
Zˆ/
√
2 we have
ω0j = w1
(
CjZ − Cj−Z
)
, (C21)
ω1j = w2
(
CjX − Cj−X
)
, (C22)
ω2j = −w2
(
CjY − Cj−Y
)
, (C23)
ω3j =
1
2
(
CjZ − Cj−Z
)
, (C24)
where
w1 =
1
2
〈ΨI |AA′ Iˆ⊗ Zˆ |ΨI〉AA′ =
1
2
(2b− 1) , (C25)
w2 =
1
2
〈ΨI |AA′ Xˆ ⊗ Xˆ |ΨI〉AA′
= −1
2
〈ΨI |AA′ Yˆ ⊗ Yˆ |ΨI〉AA′ =
√
b(1− b). (C26)
There is one constraint on Alice’s reduced state, given by
ω30 =
1
2
〈ΨI |AA′ Zˆ ⊗ Iˆ |ΨI〉AA′ = w1. (C27)
The full expression for ρAB is
ρAB =
1
4
(
I⊗ I + ω30Zˆ ⊗ I + ω01 Iˆ⊗ Xˆ + ω02 Iˆ⊗ Yˆ
+ ω03 Iˆ⊗ Zˆ + ω11Xˆ ⊗ Xˆ + ω12Xˆ ⊗ Yˆ + ω13Xˆ ⊗ Zˆ
+ ω21Yˆ ⊗ Xˆ + ω22Yˆ ⊗ Yˆ + ω23Yˆ ⊗ Zˆ + ω31Zˆ ⊗ Xˆ
+ ω32Zˆ ⊗ Yˆ + ω33Zˆ ⊗ Zˆ
)
, (C28)
where each ωkj contains two free parameters Cjµ, except
for ω30 which is fixed, as well as the pairs ω0j and ω3j
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which both involve CjZ . In this calculation we have made
no distinction between Ωˆkj and Γˆkj , and impose the con-
straints from the known expectation values of the Γˆkj as
constraints on ρAB in our convex optimization over the
parameters Cjµ via expressions of the form
Tr
[
ρABΓˆ
k
j
]
= γkj . (C29)
Note that we have pulled out a factor of 1/2 from ωkj in
Eq. (C28).
Appendix D: Numerical Calculation of the Secret
Key Rate
1. Problem Description and Dimensional
Reduction
We follow the general QKD scheme described in
[23], using a source replacement scheme to describe the
prepare-and-measure protocols under consideration. Al-
ice sends one half of an initial state
∣∣ΨIAB〉 to Bob, and
Eve has access to this half of the state before it reaches
Bob. Alice and Bob perform measurements on their
halves of the final state, described by a set of POVMs,
and record the basis they chose to measure in the Hilbert
spaces A˜ and B˜. They record the outcomes of their mea-
surements in Hilbert spaces A and B. For simplicity, we
assume that there is a one-to-one mapping of outcomes
to key-characters, so that the result of the key-map is
stored in the register A directly, without the need to in-
troduce another register to store the key-map results (as
would be in the most general protocol described in [23]).
Focussing on the specific example of BB84, the mea-
surement and key-map POVM is described by the oper-
ators
KˆAZ =
√
p
(
|0〉A˜ ⊗ IˆB˜ ⊗ |0〉A ⊗ IˆB ⊗ |0〉〈0|A ⊗ IˆB
+ |0〉A˜ ⊗ IˆB˜ ⊗ |1〉A ⊗ IˆB ⊗ |1〉〈1|A ⊗ IˆB
)
, (D1)
KˆAX =
√
1− p
(
|1〉A˜ ⊗ IˆB˜ ⊗ |0〉A ⊗ IˆB ⊗ |+〉〈+|A ⊗ IˆB
+ |1〉A˜ ⊗ IˆB˜ ⊗ |1〉A ⊗ IˆB ⊗ |−〉〈−|A ⊗ IˆB
)
, (D2)
KˆBZ =
√
p
(
IˆA˜ ⊗ |0〉B˜ ⊗ IˆA ⊗ |0〉B ⊗ IˆA ⊗ |0〉〈0|B
+ IˆA˜ ⊗ |0〉B˜ ⊗ IˆA ⊗ |1〉B ⊗ IˆA ⊗ |1〉〈1|B
)
, (D3)
KˆBX =
√
1− p
(
IˆA˜ ⊗ |1〉B˜ ⊗ IˆA ⊗ |0〉B ⊗ IˆA ⊗ |+〉〈+|B
+ IˆA˜ ⊗ |1〉B˜ ⊗ IˆA ⊗ |1〉B ⊗ IˆA ⊗ |−〉〈−|B
)
, (D4)
with p the probability that Alice (Bob) measures in the Z-
basis. Note that for A we use a key-map where the mea-
surement outcome pairs {0,+} and {1,−} correspond to
the same character in the secret key. After these measure-
ments, Alice and Bob will post-select on having measured
in the same basis, described by the operator
Πˆ = |0〉〈0|A˜ ⊗ |0〉〈0|B˜ ⊗ Iˆ4 + |1〉〈1|A˜ ⊗ |1〉〈1|B˜ ⊗ Iˆ4 (D5)
where Iˆ4 is a 4-qubit identity operator.
The full operation Alice and Bob apply to the state
ρAB is therefore described by the process
G(ρAB) = Πˆ
 ∑
a,b∈(Z,X)
(
KˆAa Kˆ
B
b
)
ρAB
(
KˆAa Kˆ
B
b
)† Πˆ†
=
(
KˆAZ Kˆ
B
Z
)
ρAB
(
KˆAZ Kˆ
B
Z
)†
+
(
KˆAXKˆ
B
X
)
ρAB
(
KˆAXKˆ
B
X
)†
= p2z |0〉〈0|A˜ ⊗ |0〉〈0|B˜ ⊗ ρz + p2x |1〉〈1|A˜ ⊗ |1〉〈1|B˜ ⊗ ρx,
(D6)
where we have introduced states ρz and ρx in the ABAB
Hilbert space defined by
|0〉〈0|A˜ ⊗ |0〉〈0|B˜ ⊗ ρz = 1
p2z
(
KˆAZ Kˆ
B
Z
)
ρAB
(
KˆAZ Kˆ
B
Z
)†
,
(D7)
|1〉〈1|A˜ ⊗ |1〉〈1|B˜ ⊗ ρx = 1
p2x
(
KˆAXKˆ
B
X
)
ρAB
(
KˆAXKˆ
B
X
)†
,
(D8)
with pz = p and px = 1 − p introduced for brevity. We
consider a trivial key-map from A → R that copies the
values of the register A and stores them in the register
R. As such, we can combine the registers A and R, and
act upon A as we would R for the rest of the calculation
[37].
The main numerical task to evaluate the secret key
rate is to solve the minimization problem
min
ρAB
D(G(ρAB)||ZA(G(ρAB))) (D9)
where, as a reminder, ZH is a pinching channel acting
on Hilbert space H. In the form currently written, while
the minimization is only over 22 × 22 Hermitian matri-
ces, the actual operations themselves involve 26× 26 size
matrices. This is far from ideal in terms of both mem-
ory usage and computational time, though not a problem
for the original method developed in [23]. However, for
the approach used here, the convex approximation to the
matrix logarithm creates even larger objects in memory
[34], and we have found that the memory usage was far
more than what is commonly available on a single work
station.
However, we will now show that
D(G(ρAB)||ZA(G(ρAB)))
= p2zD(ρAB ||ZAZ (ρAB)) + p2xD(ρAB ||ZAX(ρAB)), (D10)
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where
ZAZ (ρAB) =
(
|0〉〈0|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
ρAB
(
|0〉〈0|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
+
(
|1〉〈1|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
ρAB
(
|1〉〈1|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
(D11)
ZAX(ρAB) =
(
|+〉〈+|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
ρAB
(
|+〉〈+|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
+
(
|−〉〈−|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
ρAB
(
|−〉〈−|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
, (D12)
with the subscripts of the pinching channels indicating
the basis used. Thus, we only need to deal with 4 ×
4 matrices in the optimization, and the secret key rate
can be calculated by simultaneous minimization of two
relative entropies, with all operations performed in only
the AB Hilbert space.
The first step is to prove that
D(G(ρAB)||ZA(G(ρAB)))
= p2zD(ρz||ZA(ρz)) + p2xD(ρx||ZA(ρx)). (D13)
Looking at the structure of Eq. (D6), we see that it can
be written in block-diagonal form as
G(ρAB) =
 p
2ρz
0
0
(1− p)2ρx
 . (D14)
With this in mind, we will prove the following lemma to
prove Eq. (D13).
Lemma 1 Given two matrices M = S ⊕ T and M ′ =
S′⊕T ′, where dim(S) = dim(S′) and dim(T ) = dim(T ′),
then
Tr [M log(M)] = Tr [S log(S)] + Tr [T log(T )] , (D15)
Tr [M log(M ′)] = Tr [S log(S′)] + Tr [T log(T ′)] . (D16)
Using lemma 1 with the identification M = G(ρAB) and
M ′ = ZA(G(ρAB)) proves Eq. (D13). This identification
is possible since the pinching channel does not change the
block diagonal structure of G(ρAB).
We then use the following lemma to prove the full re-
sult.
Lemma 2 Given ρµ, ρAB, and ZHµ defined as before,
then
D(ρz||ZA(ρz)) = D(ρAB ||ZAZ (ρAB)) (D17)
D(ρx||ZA(ρx)) = D(ρAB ||ZAX(ρAB)) (D18)
Eq. (D10) follows from application of this lemma to
Eq. (D13).
Therefore, solving the minimization problem
min
ρAB
p2D(ρAB ||ZAZ (ρAB)) + (1− p)2D(ρAB ||ZAX(ρAB)),
(D19)
is equivalent to solving the original minimization prob-
lem, but only involves the original Hilbert space of Alice
and Bob. This considerably reduces the memory and
computational power required to numerically calculate
the secret key rate. We note that applications of lemma
1 beyond those discussed here likely exist, and that ver-
sions of lemma 2 exits for other QKD protocols [37].
a. Proof of Lemma 1
This result follows straightforwardly from the fact that
log(S ⊕ T ) = log(S)⊕ log(T ), (D20)
provided that the eigenvalues of S and T fall within the
open set (0,∞). However, the quantum relative entropy
is defined on the half-closed set [0,∞), as we take the
convention 0 × log(0) = 0. This ensures that D(ρ||σ) is
finite even when either ρ or σ have eigenvalues that are
zero, provided that the support of ρ does not intersect
the kernel of σ. Assuming supp(ρ) ∩ ker(σ) = 0, then
our convention ensures that lemma 1 is valid on [0,∞)
as desired.
b. Proof of Lemma 2
From Eqs. (D7), we have that
ρz = LˆZρABLˆ
†
Z (D21)
where
LˆZ = |00〉AB ⊗ |00〉〈00|AB + |01〉AB ⊗ |01〉〈01|AB
+ |10〉AB ⊗ |10〉〈10|AB + |11〉AB ⊗ |11〉〈11|AB . (D22)
We have that(
|0〉〈0|A ⊗ Iˆ3
)
LˆZ (D23)
= |00〉AB ⊗ |00〉〈00|AB + |01〉AB ⊗ |01〉〈01|AB
=
(
Iˆ2 ⊗ |0〉〈0|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
LˆZ = LˆZ
(
Iˆ2 ⊗ |0〉〈0|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
,
and(
|1〉〈1|A ⊗ Iˆ3
)
LˆZ (D24)
= |10〉AB ⊗ |10〉〈10|AB + |11〉AB ⊗ |11〉〈11|AB
=
(
Iˆ2 ⊗ |1〉〈1|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
LˆZ = LˆZ
(
Iˆ2 ⊗ |1〉〈1|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
,
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and therefore
ZA(ρz) =
1∑
i=0
(
|i〉〈i|A ⊗ Iˆ3
)
LˆZρABLˆ
†
Z
(
|i〉〈i|A ⊗ Iˆ3
)
=
1∑
i=0
(
Iˆ2 ⊗ |i〉〈i|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
LˆZρABLˆ
†
Z
(
Iˆ2 ⊗ |i〉〈i|A ⊗ Iˆ
)
= ZAZ (ρz) = LˆZ
(ZAZ (ρAB)) Lˆ†Z . (D25)
Thus, we have reduced the problem to showing that
D(LˆZρABLˆ
†
Z ||LˆZ
(ZAZ (ρAB)) Lˆ†Z) = D(ρAB ||ZAZ (ρAB)).
(D26)
Using the fact that
L†ZLZ = Iˆ2, (D27)
we see that
Tr
[
LˆZρABLˆ
†
Z log
(
LˆZρABLˆ
†
Z
)]
(D28)
= Tr
[
LˆZρABLˆ
†
ZLˆZ log(ρAB)Lˆ
†
Z
]
= Tr [ρAB log(ρAB)] ,
and
Tr
[
LˆZρABLˆ
†
Z log
(
LˆZZAZ (ρAB) Lˆ†Z
)]
(D29)
= Tr
[
LˆZρABLˆ
†
ZLˆZ log
(ZAZ (ρAB))Lˆ†Z]
= Tr
[
ρAB log
(ZAZ (ρAB))] ,
which completes the proof for ρz. Starting with
ρx = LˆXρABLˆ
†
X , (D30)
LˆX = |00〉AB ⊗ |++〉〈++|AB + |01〉AB ⊗ |+−〉〈+−|AB
+ |10〉AB ⊗ |−+〉〈−+|AB + |11〉AB ⊗ |−−〉〈−−|AB ,
(D31)
and following a similar procedure to that outlined for ρz
proves the full lemma.
Appendix E: Channel Estimation and Error
Correction
In order to compare the performance of different pro-
tocols under these two scenarios, we simulate observed
statistics using the depolarizing channel. To put our pa-
rameterization of the depolarizing channel in context, for
symmetric BB84 (b = 1/2), the commonly quoted quan-
tum bit-error rate (QBER) is half what we define as the
depolarizing probability (channel error), . We use the
depolarizing probability rather than the QBER as for
asymmetric protocols there is an inherent bit-error rate
even when the channel is perfect ( = 0). For a fair com-
parison we compare protocols with the same error added
by the channel, i.e. the depolarizing probability, rather
than the same total error.
As a function of the depolarizing probability the con-
straints imposed on the SDP by parameter estimation
are given by
γz/x = Tr
[
Edep (ρAA′) EˆZ/X
]
, (E1)
γij = Tr
[
Edep (ρAA′) Eˆij
]
, (E2)
depending on the channel reconciliation protocol chosen.
For b = 1/2 (i.e. symmetric BB84) the fine-grained con-
straints reduce to γz/x = /2 as expected.
From the channel model, we obtain the simulated prob-
ability distribution P (x, y) that Alice and Bob would ob-
serve from an experiment. In this case, if we assume the
error correction can be performed at the Shannon limit,
then leakEC = H(X|Y ), where X is Alice’s raw key and
Y is Bob’s measurement outcomes. H(X|Y ) is the con-
ditional Shannon entropy
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
x,y
P (x, y) log2 P (x|y), (E3)
for a joint probability distribution P (x, y) and condi-
tional probability distribution P (x|y). For our purposes,
P (x, y) can be calculated via the trace of ρAB with the
appropriate POVM operators for measurement in each
basis (see appendix D for these operators), and is a
4 × 4 matrix of probabilities. We also incorporate our
post-selection/sifting into P (x, y), by setting P (x, y) = 0
where Alice and Bob did not measure in the same basis
(as these events are not used in the key generation), and
renormalize P (x, y) by the probability that post selection
is successful
ppass = p
2 + (1− p)2, (E4)
which is the probability that Alice and Bob both mea-
sure in either the Z- or X-basis. Finally, due to Alice’s
key-map, we add together the elements of P (x, y) for
each pair of Alice’s raw measurement outcomes that cor-
respond to the same key character, resulting in a 2 × 4
matrix of probabilities.
Appendix F: Security of the Key Rate Lower Bound
The numerical approach used in this work, built off
the convex approximation of the quantum relative en-
tropy from of Ref. [34], solves and approximate version
of the dual problem to obtain a lower bound on the secret
key rate. To obtain a secure lower bound, one can use
the techniques of Ref. [34] to obtain error bounds on the
approximation to the quantum relative entropy, in terms
of the error bounds on the matrix logarithm. Taking
the lower bound of these error bounds gives a secure key
rate lower bound. As the order of the approximations
used in Ref. [34] is increased, the calculated secret key
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Figure 2. Relative difference between the key rate lower
bound calculated using the convex approximation of Ref. [34],
and that using the dual-linearization of Ref. [23]. In both
cases the unrestricted symmetric (b = 1/2) BB84 protocol is
considered.
rate approaches the actual value, and the error bounds
become tighter. For all numerical results presented, we
have tested increasing orders of approximation, until the
value of the key rate was constant up to a threshold value
(typically less than 10−4). Thus, we are confident that
our numerical results for the key rate lower bound are
highly accurate.
As further evidence, for the unrestricted symmetric
(b = 1/2) BB84 protocol, we have compared the key rate
calculated from our approach (using the approximation of
Ref. [34]) to that calculated using the dual-linearization
approach of [23]. The relative difference between the re-
sults of the two approaches is shown in Fig. 2. As can
be seen, the key rates are less than a relative difference
of 10−3 away from one another (i.e. less than a 0.1% dif-
ference). We have not applied the second step method
of Ref. [23] to the restricted situation, as this would re-
quire deriving a new linearized dual to the SDP of the
restricted situation.
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